Wednesday, February 15, 2006

The revolution will be blogged

These days it is somewhat difficult to pin down what exactly we mean when we say "right-wing" or "conservative." In America, at least, this difficulty has arisen because the contemporary right-wing has largely abandoned the small-government conservatism of Goldwater in favor of what blogger Glenn Greenwald calls "authoritarian cultism"--a blind allegiance to the executive and an expansion of the federal government over citizens' civil liberties.

However, there is one transhistorical component (not in a spooky, Hegelian sense but as a statement of historical fact) that remains a plank of right-wing thought: that ordinary people should not have the same right to express themselves as the cultural elite. This critique goes as far back as Socrates and Plato, who faulted the Athenian democracy for giving voice to the banausoi: less-educated members of the demos who worked in manual labor or craftsmanship. These people, the "refuse" of society, did not have the time or rational capacity to contribute to politics, or so went the elitist trope of Socrates, Plato, Xenophon, Aristotle, Thucydides--indeed, most of the extant and widely-read Greek literature. Not only should they not be involved in the political process, but their cultural practices--the theater, popular song, etc--corrupted the polity as a whole and undermined the stability of elite rule. Thus Plato in the Republic bans all but the most militaristic and harmonious mousike and prescribes a "one man, one job" rule in order to prevent polupragmosune, or "meddling," to the benefit of the aristocracy.

This line of thought is in full view for all to see in today's Weekly Standard. In an article titled "Web 2.0" by Andrew Keen, a "veteran Silicon Valley entrepreneur and digital media critic," the author takes up the right-wing cause against the rising tide of democratic internet use. Keen begins by equating the "internet revolution" with the "grand utopian movements" of Revolutionary France, Communist Russia, and the counter-cultural 60s. He discusses a meeting he had with an internet entrepeneur:

The entrepreneur, like me a Silicon Valley veteran, was pitching me his latest start-up: a technology platform that creates easy-to-use software tools for online communities to publish weblogs, digital movies, and music. It is technology that enables anyone with a computer to become an author, a film director, or a musician. This Web 2.0 dream is Socrates's nightmare: technology that arms every citizen with the means to be an opinionated artist or writer.
Looks like the masses are getting all uppity again! They want their avenues of self expression and creative thought! Didn't we teach them that only the cultural vanguard has the time and education for such things?

Keen cites some of the buzzwords of the new digital era, which he finds "more militant and absurd" than the first dot.com boom:
Empowering citizen media, radically democratize, smash elitism, content redistribution, authentic community . . . . This sociological jargon, once the preserve of the hippie counterculture, has now become the lexicon of new media capitalism.

And here I thought that under capitalism, standards of living would rise and the lower and middle classes would be afforded the opportunity to enjoy the fruits of their leisure: personal expression, hobbies, pasttimes, the ability to associate with one another and propagate their ideas. I think that this is largely true, and has occurred to a wonderful degree, but Keen wants to cling to reactionary normative claims about whom should be allowed to participate in what forms of culture.

After stating that the "ideological outcome may be trouble for all of us," Keen seeks to refine what exactly that ideological says:

SO WHAT, exactly, is the Web 2.0 movement? As an ideology, it is based upon a series of ethical assumptions about media, culture, and technology. It worships the creative amateur: the self-taught filmmaker, the dorm-room musician, the unpublished writer. It suggests that everyone--even the most poorly educated and inarticulate amongst us--can and should use digital media to express and realize themselves. Web 2.0 "empowers" our creativity, it "democratizes" media, it "levels the playing field" between experts and amateurs. The enemy of Web 2.0 is "elitist" traditional media.
I have highlighted the selected text to show the extent to which Keen is fighting an elitist ideological battle. Keen's own response to the Web 2.0 movement must be the obverse of that statement: namely, that the poorly educated and inarticulate should not be encouraged to express and realize themselves, for this "meddling" might pollute or contaminate our standards and traditional values.

If it seems unclear as to why Keen feels this way, here is a sampling of his reasoning:

The consequences of Web 2.0 are inherently dangerous for the vitality of culture and the arts. Its empowering promises play upon that legacy of the '60s--the creeping narcissism that Christopher Lasch described so presciently, with its obsessive focus on the realization of the self.

Another word for narcissism is "personalization." Web 2.0 technology personalizes culture so that it reflects ourselves rather than the world around us. Blogs personalize media content so that all we read are our own thoughts. Online stores personalize our preferences, thus feeding back to us our own taste. Google personalizes searches so that all we see are advertisements for products and services we already use.

Instead of Mozart, Van Gogh, or Hitchcock, all we get with the Web 2.0 revolution is more of ourselves.

I can understand the fear of the "culture of narcissism" and the unreflective contentment with one's own thoughts and values. In this way Keen is similar to the Jeremiahs of the Frankfurt School, who decried the vulgar mass media "Culture Industry" of advertisements, B movies, and popular songs which reified the commodity fetish and kept ordinary people enraptured with petty baubles . Yet the difference is that Horkheimer and Adorno saw the Culture Industry as an extension of capital, whereas Keen thinks capitalism--or, more accurately, elitist monopoly--is the last vanguard of "true art" like Mozart, Van Gogh, and Hitchcock. His points about narcissism and vulgarization are effectively negated by his critique of the "realization of the self." His message is clear: "You are unable to realize yourself on your own, so let us (the wise, the educated, the artistic) realize you for you." Now, which are we more afraid of? The possibility, one alternative out of many, that democratization will lead to insularity and vulgarity, or the necessity of an ideology that states that identity formation is best left to the elite?

Keen's critique is not only cultural, but economic: the internet is decreasing revenues and punishing stockholders of mainstream media production.
Traditional "elitist" media is being destroyed by digital technologies. Newspapers are in freefall. Network television, the modern equivalent of the dinosaur, is being shaken by TiVo's overnight annihilation of the 30-second commercial. The iPod is undermining the multibillion dollar music industry. Meanwhile, digital piracy, enabled by Silicon Valley hardware and justified by Silicon Valley intellectual property communists such as Larry Lessig, is draining revenue from established artists, movie studios, newspapers, record labels, and song writers.

The classical capitalist answer to this phenomenon should be: So what? Popular culture is decreasing demands for certain industries--let those industries acclimatize or perish. The biggest objection to Keen's critique is that the problem he describes is not a matter of greater socialization, for their is no state apparatus at work behind these changes, but popularization. He is not a capitalist but a corporate and cultural monopolist. His hypocrisy is apparent in these lines: "The purpose of our media and culture industries--beyond the obvious need to make money and entertain people--is to discover, nurture, and reward elite talent."

Yes, reward those that have connections, money, and a foot in the door of the existing monopolies. Keen neglects to mention that many musical acts have gained an audience through the mass culture of the internet before landing themselves an exclusive record contract with one of the major labels. Record label talent scouts used to have to search the market themselves, and their eventual choices reflected not necessarily the talent or popularity of a group but the ability of the label to mold the band into a marketable and easily digestible product. Now they are often forced to accept bands as they are, due to their already existing following on the internet. This leads to a more diversified market, and I fail to see how that is a bad thing.

Keen ends on a particularly prophetic note, with a call for an elite "authoritative voice":
Without an elite mainstream media, we will lose our memory for things learnt, read, experienced, or heard. The cultural consequences of this are dire, requiring the authoritative voice of at least an Allan Bloom, if not an Oswald Spengler. But here in Silicon Valley, on the brink of the Web 2.0 epoch, there no longer are any Blooms or Spenglers. All we have is the great seduction of citizen media, democratized content and authentic online communities. And weblogs, of course. Millions and millions of blogs.
To which I can only respond, riding high on my belief in egalitarian communication, democratization of culture, and the right of every individual to express him- or herself, "Hell yes."

9 Comments:

Blogger Austin 5-000 said...

I can't disagree with this guy more. In terms of economics, the difference between the old and new media regime is this: by dramatically lowering the cost of market entry in monetary terms we are increasing the supply of accessible, expressed thought. What does this actually mean?
It means that we are more able to worry about the ideas themselves then the material structure that supports them(book, magazine, "zine", personal journal, scrap of paper). This further implies that control of the material structure gives much less control over the ideas themselves, opening up avenues for thoughts that would not have survived in the previous media outlets.
I think the best part about this is that it decreases the division of thought into specific genres: For example, if I'm a writer I no longer need to send my liberal articles to the Nation and my conservative articles to the Weekly Standard. I can put them on my own website and people can see that a unique position exists between these two institutionalized positions. The same principle applies for the division between academic and other kinds of thought: the categories will be less discrete.
For a believer in the Millian marketplace of ideas, the internet is a wet dream.
But does this all mean as much as we think?
I'm not sure, because there is no way to estimate how the multidimensional changes (academic/lay thought, "liberal"/conservative, high/pop culture) will interact with one another. But it is not as if there will be no structure to the new knowledge-sphere(Wissenkeit). A network of hubs and nodes will evolve: hubs will give some ideas greater distribution than others. You can see new hubs such as Metafilter, Digg, Google-News(an interesting, different type), and the transformation of old paper-based information distributors. Think, for instance of the New York Times. The fact that websites are now important to the news means that old media now redirects access to new media: acting as a hub, perhaps not in the sense that there is a hyperlink, but in the sense that it sends consumers of knowledge from one place to another. Moreover, websites for these old-media institutions now create forums for individual self-expression, meaning that they are now hubs not only in the sense that they link to knowledge but in that they draw in knowledge from multiple levels (i.e. they draw in information not only through reporters and their methods but also from unassociated individuals).
All of this increases the amount of ideas colliding to create new, more comprehensive truths (in Millian Terms). The really interesting Marxist/materialist question is how this new mode of production(the internet+other technological changes) will influence the contents of thought.

5:07 PM  
Blogger to scranton said...

I agree with you about "hubs." The elitist critique is that without some superstructure, society will collapse into anarchy. Keen mentions the "flat noise of opinion" that would have horrified Socrates. But the internet is not a collapse of ideas but a *restructuring*. I am not simply assaulted with random information when perusing the internet--I know where to go, and those sites link to sites which link to sites, etc. Rather than restricting my worldview to opinions that merely echo my own, in three steps I can move from a liberal journalist to a conservative lawyer to a communist agitator to someone who doesn't give a fuck about government but wants to turn me on to a new band. In between there are blogrolls and meta-sites (AL Daily, metafilter, etc) that direct me. Hip hip hooray for that.

5:23 PM  
Blogger to scranton said...

I realized when writing my post that the idea of "internet as knowledge" would have its detractors. Because in addition to Keen's right-wing critique, there is the radical critique that in the end it is all sound and fury, signifying nothing, while greater problems await transcendent, transformative truths to liberate them. This is the concern, no? But it depends on the revolution you want.

I didn't want to make the "internet revolution" out to be a messianic power, ushering in a new age. Rather, I wanted to protect the phenomenon from elitists like Keen, who would disalloy it in the first place because it disturbs their grasp on the flow of information. I don't think that the internet will necessarily save us, but I do think it is precisely the sort of outlet a democracy needs if its going to be robust and its citizens are going to be informed. It's really too early to tell how it will affect things in the long run, but in 20 years what will things look like?

What is the alternative to the internet? What is the best medium for delivering potent (as opposed to "impotent, failing to spur a revolution") truths? A book, a tract, a grassroots meeting? I can understand the fear that the internet will make us lazier readers and keep us isolated from one another. But like I said, there is the possibility that it can help better organize us, help us direct ourselves against enemies (politicians, advocates, corporatists, religious fanatics) we never knew existed.

What is the revolution of consciousness?

6:40 PM  
Blogger danny marcus said...

Re: "All of this increases the amount of ideas colliding to create new, more comprehensive truths (in Millian Terms)."

and

"Rather than restricting my worldview to opinions that merely echo my own, in three steps I can move from a liberal journalist to a conservative lawyer to a communist agitator to someone who doesn't give a fuck about government but wants to turn me on to a new band."

In a much earlier post, I attempted to argue that in Lacanian terms the internet cannot foster any sort of revolutionary project, or indeed any sociality "in the internet" - that as a mirror of fantasy (in Lacan's terms, fantasy is that mechanism by which the subject relates to things and Others in the world), it supports the already culturally pervasive fetishization and annulment of "radical politics." I would invite readers to review/critique my arguments in that post, especially as I intend to challenge the model of subjectivity which would allow for the "expression" of a so-called "unique [intellectual?] position":

http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=17307379&postID=113632697860636907

Re: "What is the alternative to the internet? What is the best medium for delivering potent (as opposed to "impotent, failing to spur a revolution") truths."

The internet has been revolutionary, I have argued, in fostering revolt along the lines of the Columbine murders - the fantasy of a single individual or small, local group, is sanctified in the mirror that is the screen; the violence which erupts in reality is uncanny - it was okay that such people were "on" the internet, but heaven forbid that they do anything in the "real world." Perhaps this is what Baudrillard means by his term, "deterrence." The real world is certainly the alternative to the internet; in a sense, the book as well as a technological instrument, runs contrary to internet logic, the ruthless circulation and updating which it requires of information. Once something is changed on the internet, it is completely irretreivable... there is something Orwellian about such a state of things. As fishstix has suggested, only in the world of production can anything revolutionary happen, and anything revolutionary is that which categorically exceeds the limits of a (signifying) system such as the internet, or better, "information."

8:58 PM  
Blogger to scranton said...

Now, before we get into arguments about the pros and cons of the internet as a revolutionary device, I'd like to reiterate what I said earlier: it depends on the revolution you want.

Keen's thesis is that the internet destroys cultural standards and media monopolies by granting greater avenues of self expression to non-experts--to ordinary, everyday folk. My counter-thesis is that such thinking exemplifies a certain elitist, historical mode of thinking--the thinking espoused by the Greek anti-democratic philosophers, by feudal notions of hierarchy, by upper class opposition to expanded notions of citizenship (i.e. the vote is not confined to property-owning males), by cultural doomsayers like Alan Bloom who thought the 60s represented the death of all things sacred (classical forms of music, Classical studies, etc). On the contrary, I assert that such thinking denies the basic dignity of ordinary people, those not graced with the money and connections to afford a higher education and whose voices are ritually excluded on those grounds. Instead, citizenship should mean input from all levels of society, that the voice of the other is not neglected. No matter what you want to say about the internet's revolutionary potential, I think it's better than Keen's alternative.

Fishstix: you agree to the only two points I was trying to make. "I understand you believe the Internet revolution will loosen the grip on information by the powerful. I agree. I also agree with your ideas on organization." Isn't this a net gain in positive goods? Again, I'm not asking for a social upheaval, so that's not a criterion for my conception of success.

Kushakov rightly points out the dark side of the internet. Columbine, violent chatrooms, the ability for racists to propagate hatred--these are serious concerns. Not only that, but when the results are not outwardly violent, they are inwardly stultifying and retardant. A nation of hermetic narcissists, watching their fantasies reflected before them...I would only say that while the Lacanian points about the subject experiencing himself through the mirror of the webpage might hold up insofar as the individual remains seated before the screen, we can't imagine that when he or she enters the public lifeworld, as inevitably happens, the effects of the influx of information are null and void. Instead, we carry with ourselves new knowledge, such as:

-the systematic lies of our elected officials

-the injustices carried out (sometimes in our name) in the rest of the world

-information on where to convene, where to vote, where to donate, even something as simple as where to watch a film, meet an author, the conceptual tools for talking about a certain book, etc.

Has this changed my actions? (The concern here is that we change our actions, not the stuff in our heads.) Admittedly, not all that much. But I hope that collectively it will affect people, though. In some respects, it already has. For example, charitable organizations have utilized the internet to double their normal income.

http://www.afpnet.org/ka/ka-3.cfm?content_item_id=12590&folder_id=2345

That's a start, right?

10:06 PM  
Blogger danny marcus said...

fishstix -

First, I am confused as to your sudden departure, in the corporeal/geographic sense. When I saw you on the morning of your flight, driving a car packed full of shit, I thought, "Oh, perhaps the reason I haven't seen [fishstix] in a while is because he's been living out of his car, like my freshman year roommate." But apparently things were not as they seemed.

I must admit that I stopped reading your posts after the second of the four. I'm sure they're all good, deserving posts... but I'm really very tired.

I do want to point out, however, or rather pontificate upon the problem of language. Because you seem to support the notion (an entirely modernist one) that if we restructure language, we will restructure our consciousness. As a student of Lacan, I find this a little bit ridiculous. According to Lacan, language (the symbolic) is an order of meaning which the subject necessarily penetrates in order to become social (in order to be). But it is not the only order of meaning; prior to identification in language, the subject intersects with the "imaginary" - a level of meaning structured on and around pleasure, of the bodily kind, certainly, but specifically with relation to the idealization of self... see his essay on "The Mirror-phase"... it's an easy one to find. Without wanting to drag you too deeply into this stuff, I would rather suggest that your assumption that change in language = change in social relations assumes, as Foucault would have you think, that such relations are always constructed discursively. Certainly discourse matters. But so does pleasure, and even more so does desire. Yet another set of problems for radical thought. But if you are serious about this stuff, you should try to get a handle on Lacan, because he's not going to go away.

2:46 AM  
Blogger danny marcus said...

No, that's what Judith Butler believes, or did in 1990. It's most certainly Foucault's argument, or so I believe. But Lacan does not write that "our identities and our desires are determined by language"; rather, our "identities" (the term ego might be more appropriate to his discussion) is first solidified as an imaginary identification during the first six-eight months of infantile development. The mirror-phase, he writes, occurs when the infant identifies with his mirror image, the ideal of a unified, gestalt self; this is what Lacan, borrowing from Freud, calls "ideal ego." Accompanying this identification, which, I should stress, is NOT a function of language, as the infant has not yet entered into language, is the identification with an ideal point of view from which the infant "sees himself" (and from which he passes judgement) - this is the "ego ideal." Very pallindromic. But this process occurs PRIOR to language; it concerns and is regulated by pleasure, the infant's effort at self-mastery in light of maternal aggression (most easily conceived of in terms of the interruption of suckling when the breast is removed). For Lacan, pleasure (jouissance) is not within the purview of language (the symbolic), but rather of the imaginary.

Lacan would be quick to point out that the infant's eventual entry into language, and thus paternal law, is completely necessary in order for the infant to become social (to become at all). Also, for Lacan as for Freud, desire is absolutely prior to language; language may offer up the range of objects of desire, but it in no way creates desire or pleasure. For this reason, I think language constitutes a remarkably poor terrain for radical social change. Perhaps we can agree that the most powerful instruments of social change are those which alter the structure of social relations - forces of production, yes, but also family structure. I am with Baudrillard in thinking that the fabrication and circulation of images plays a major part as well in the structuring of socialization. In fact, I think Lacan's theory supports to some degree your previous positions against culture industry. In any event, I would encourage you to look into Lacan (again) if you're interested; if not Lacan, the Bruce Fink, who has written a very good book (actually, several very good books) called "The Lacanian Subject."

12:22 AM  
Blogger danny marcus said...

Then I have to ask, what will your new language consist of?

I think you should find a better reason to hate psychoanalysis than its emphasis on structure over content. If you want to hear about content, all you'd need to do is see a shrink. If you're interested in structure, read psychoanalytic theory; but I don't think the aims of pysch theory are to pass judgement on the ideas which float around in the symbolic order. If Lacan/Freud is getting any more popular, it's certainly not in the field of neuroscience, but rather in (post)Marxist thought, which is definitely one field which has had to grapple with the problem of ideology (its mechanisms, ways of being "in ideology").

10:47 AM  
Blogger danny marcus said...

Let me add, also, that while I agree with you and Lacan that the symbolic order does give structure to desire, one cannot just wave a magic wand and give a subject a new language (which would require a new master signifier, a new locus of phallocentrism). The problem to which you refer is, for Lacan, the clinical one: how do we get a subject to change his or her identifications in a clinical setting? Lacan's solution was to forestall at every point along the way the analysand's attempts to identify with the analyst's desire. I understand that it was Jacques-Alain Miller's practice to cut off a session the moment he felt that the analysand had said something of importance (thus his sessions could last for less than ten minutes). But I don't think these clinical procedures would satisfy your (or my) idea of radical social change. I think, however, that Lacan's clinical ethics may be applied as a general legal ethics, or rather as an ethics of institutions and the avoidance of ideological thinking. To apply Lacan's clinical thinking in practice would amount to the existence of an institution with which no one can identify but to which they belong as individuals. I am not as yet sure whether this sort of thing is possible, but as you rightly point out, there are parallels between this sort of thinking and that of Deleuze & Guattari (I am thinking of their "treatise on nomadology" in A Thousand Plateaus). In any event, I cannot conceive of any restructuring of the symbolic order that does not require a restructuring of institutions of power (those of production, both material and ideological). I would welcome your thoughts on this

11:06 AM  

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