Tomorrow is a
big day for Venezuela. If you read most of the news outlets, especially several pieces that have run in the
New York Times and the
Washington Post, you get the impression that the proposed constitutional reforms will
"grant the state absolute control over the people" (
Times op-ed by former Chavez ally),
make Chavez "president for life" with the help of "armed Chavista thugs" (
Times editorial), that it's a
"grab for socialist-emperor status" that is "grotesque and dangerous -- as Fascism was" (Roger Cohen), that Chavez shares a vision of
"high-modernist authoritarianism" with Stalin, Mao, and Ceausescu (
Washington Post op-ed), and similarly that Chavez is a
"tyrant," "an aspiring dictator," and a "threat to the global order" (Donald Rumsfeld, of all people, in the
Post). And, of course, in all of this, Chavez's supporters, the poor (i.e. the majority) have been variously "clients who can be bought off," "crowd-pleased," and "manipulated."
You can probably tell that I find much in these accounts to be exaggerated, even hysterical. First, some basic facts: Chavez is a democratically elected President, and the constitutional reforms are being presented as a democratic referendum, with
monitoring provided by more than 80 international observers,
including the NAACP and the National Lawyers Guild from the U.S. (Although it is important to note that some of the usual monitoring groups, like the UN, won't be included this time.)
Second, there's the reforms themselves. What do they propose?
This IHT piece sums them up nicely:
- Presidential terms extended from 6 to 7 years.
- Term limits eliminated.
- Presidential control over the Central Bank.
- Higher numbers required for constitutional and legislative referenda.
- Mandatory 6 hour work days.
- Creation of social security for the informal economy (almost half of Venezuela's labor force).
- Neighborhood and other local-based direct democratic institutions and workers councils.
- Extensive "state of emergency" powers for the Presidency.
There are others as well, including a lot of language about "socialism" and "anti-imperialism," for what it's worth. Now, the most troubling of these, obviously, are the state of emergency powers and presidential limits. (No doubt many critics are staunchly opposed to some of the more socialistic elements as well, but let's stick to the strict "democratic" concerns.) Again, the first thing to say is that "no term limits" does not equal "dictator for life." There could be a legitimate concern that Chavez and his party would rig elections in the future, but so far he has won elections quite handily under completely free and fair rules. Also, it's important to note that many countries have unlimited terms for their presidents and prime ministers: Australia, Japan, the Presidency of France, Portugal, Canada, and the United Kingdom. (If anyone knows if these facts are inaccurate or if the powers of these offices are far more circumscribed, let me know.)
The "state of emergency" decree is indeed disturbing, and in fact many
leftists groups within Venezuela are very concerned about it, as well as international observers like
Human Rights Watch. Other leftists think that state of emergency powers are
either more likely to be abused by "bourgeois" regimes
or aren't actual dictatorial at all; in any case people are pointing out the vastly expanded emergency powers of the American Presidency and the Military Commissions Act, as well as the fact that many other countries, including Australia, Germany, France, Canada, India, Spain, and, again, the U.S., have such "exceptional" laws enshrined in their constitutions. Finally, despite the fact that many of Chavez's supporters have been violently outspoken about their support for the referendum, the
only fatality so far has occurred at the hands of anti-government protesters. More strikingly, a supposed "plot" by the CIA
has been uncovered by the Chavez government as evidence that the U.S. is working to destabilize Venezuela (as it supposedly did in the 2002 attempted coup and in numerous events, most notably Chile, in the past). The CIA calls the document a "fake," and others are saying that the "timing is suspect," but if there was ever a time for such a document to be
written, it is of course now.
However, as far as the presidential term limits and emergency powers go, one can play the "
tu quoque" game all day -- the important question is whether such moves are good for Venezuelan democracy, perhaps even (crucially) for Venezuelan socialism. The first thing to say is that Chavez's egoism and chauvinism (chauvismo?) during this process has been appalling and hardly a model for democratic discourse. We have all been disgusted by the rhetoric of the Bush White House, and Chavez has painted a similar "us vs. them" picture. Many opposition leaders,
even hesitant radicals within Chavez's own party ranks, have been labelled "traitors." That is simply unacceptable, especially when many of these critics are challenging Chavez's "
l'etat c'est moi" attitude from the left. Even if the referendum gets the "si" vote tomorrow, civil society will probably be irreparably damaged for the near future, and who knows what sorts of actions will take place to discredit it (this is not strictly Chavez's fault at all, however).
Going hand-in-hand with this fear of Chavez's frighteningly strong personality is the possibility that his paranoid style of politics will lead to government crackdown and exploding political prisoner populations along the lines of Castroism. Many critics maintain that this state of affairs is already in play, but I think it is still only a potentiality, albeit a very dangerous one. My hope would be for more civil control on the central government from below, the paradox of this being that that is precisely what voting "no" on the referendum has come to mean for some ("maintaining checks and balances," so to speak). If Chavez loses, much of the wind will be taken out of social democracy's sails. If Chavez wins, it's possible that he could exploit his power as outlined above, or, perhaps even more menacingly, the opposition could turn even more violent. My overall hope is that the referendum could be passed with social stability intact.
This isn't much of a "final analysis," but I hope along the way I have made it clear that tomorrow's vote, while important, is not the inevitable "no turning back from dictatorship" that some thoughtless or just plain malevolent critics are making it out to be. Watching the news and commentary centered around this event has made clearer to me much of the class bias of the American press. There is simply no narrative about a country's working class movement that they can understand apart from ideas like "demagoguery," "pandering," and "manipulation." The poor must always be naive and malleable, rather than constituting the majority of the population, with demands and interests which democracies, by their very nature, ought to make central, if not exclusive, to their policies. Chavez is suspect, but at this point he must be preferable to the tin-pot authoritarians to whom we regularly give billions of dollars. As the always insightful Ken Silverstein of
Harper's says in a recent post, with regard to the American punditry establishment,
"Roger Cohen: Viva Mubarak, Fuera Chavez!"
